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Using information from two complementary household survey data sets, we show that
the dominant form of labor market adjustment in the Russian transition process has been
the delayed receipt of wages. More than half the work force is experiencing some form of
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1. INTRODUCTION
All these new ideas, reforms, theories, have penetrated even to us in the provinces, but to
see the whole picture and see it clearly, one must be in the capital.
—Dostoevesky, Crime and Punishment, 1866
Six years into transition, the Russian labor market is still in turmoil. Dramatic
falls in output and continued uncertainty surrounding the transition process had
led to a series of conﬂicts over enterprise funds among the tax authorities, the
banks, and the work force, as well as between enterprises and their regional
governments and between the regions and the center. These conﬂicts have been
exacerbated by liquidity crises at the federal level. Against this background of
uncertainty and negative output shocks, aggregate employment levels remain
relatively higher than might be expected. It may be that employment has not
fallen much because ﬁrms have adjusted to contractions in sales and growing
liquidity constraints in other ways.
2 Adjustments on the intensive, rather than the
extensive, margin, such as involuntary unpaid leaves of absence, a reduction in
hours worked, or the increased use of temporary contract work, are all possible
explanations. Moreover, some managers may tell their workers not to report for
work without making them redundant. In so doing, the enterprise avoids both
salary and redundancy payments.
Another option for ﬁrms coping with the effects of transition is price, rather
than quantity, adjustment. Firms could adjust their cost schedules by not paying
wages. Alfandari and Schaffer (1996) argue that wage arrears are used by
management in some ﬁrms to extract tax concessions from the government.
Clarke (1998) suggests that implicit or explicit agreements between the federal
government and the banks regarding the seizure of enterprise bank deposits in
2 It is of course possible that unreported activities reduce the gap between measured and actual
output. See Johnson et al. (1997) for some evidence on the extent of the unofﬁcial economy in Russia.
Nevertheless, activities in the unofﬁcial economy can only account partially for the disparate
reductions in measured output and employment.
LEHMANN, WADSWORTH, AND ACQUISTI 596order to meet federal tax and debt liabilities have left many ﬁrms with little cash
to pay wages, irrespective of the ﬁrms’ proﬁtability. A lack of credit facilities in
the banking sector then exacerbates this cash ﬂow problem.
Wage arrears could also be viewed as loans from workers with few outside
opportunities to ﬁrms in genuine distress. If a ﬁrm is dominated by insiders with
vested interests in the continued existence of the enterprise, such loans will be
more likely. If the ﬁrm is in distress, the workers’ only outlet under existing law
is to sue the ﬁrm for bankruptcy. A form of implicit contract may arise, whereby
the worker trades wage arrears for continued employment. This could be sup-
ported by the continued existence of fringe payments that may be unavailable if
the worker left the ﬁrm. Real wage cuts, over and above those already taking
place, may not achieve the same level of commitment from the work force.
Compounding all this is the role of the central government in paying off its
debts by delaying payment for state orders and refusing to release funds for the
payment of wages in the budgetary sector, i.e., health, education, and public
administration. Consequently there may be large regional variation in the inci-
dence of arrears, depending on the industrial structure, the extent of transforma-
tion, and the regional government’s response to shocks and its relationship with
the center. Certain types of workers could also be disproportionately affected.
Issues of whether ﬁrms discriminate against certain workers in their application
of wage arrears,
3 whether patronage is an important element or whether ﬁrms use
efﬁciency wage type considerations to retain the most productive members of
their workforce, have not yet been examined.
This paper attempts to help ﬁll that gap. Standing (1996) presents
establishment-level evidence of large regional variations in the proportion of
ﬁrms that experienced signiﬁcant wage arrears. However, these data are only
qualitative. In a paper subsequent to ours, Earle and Sabirianova (1999) pool
individual and enterprise data to identify ﬁrm-level effects on wage arrears. Our
paper provides evidence from two household survey data sets with which we can
analyze wage arrears across regions, industries, ﬁrm types, and individuals. The
ﬁrst is a supplement to the March 1996 and November 1997 Russian Labor Force
Survey (RLFS), conducted in initially ﬁve and then four representative regions of
the Russian Federation. The second is the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring
Survey (RLMS), a smaller but nationally sampled longitudinal survey of indi-
viduals, covering many of the same issues as the RLFS supplement and following
its sample population over the period from 1994 to 1996.
4 Desai and Idson (1998)
use the RLMS to focus on the household characteristics of those in arrears and
3 Layard and Richter (1995) give a cross-tabulation of the extent of 1994 wage arrears using the
All-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research (or VCIOM, its Russian acronym) survey of
individuals, while Gordon (1997), using VCIOM data, shows the overall rising incidence of wage
arrears between 1992 and 1996.
4 The supplement was developed by the authors, Evgeniy Gontmakher, Ingrid Leiprecht, Douglas
WAGE ARREARS IN RUSSIA 597the likelihood that this induces bartering among those affected. We extend their
analysis by introducing more establishment characteristics, and we exploit the
panel nature of the RLMS to examine individual dynamics and the persistence of
wage arrears.
While the problem of wage arrears may stem from the economic position of
the ﬁrm and the institutional structure during transition, we contend that re-
sponses by individuals can shed light on some areas that would otherwise be
difﬁcult to obtain from an analysis of ﬁrms alone. Using these two complemen-
tary data sets, we examine which individuals and which sectors are most affected
by arrears and begin to build up a picture of the evolution of some of these trends
across time.
2. DATA
The initial analysis is based on the March 1996 and November 1997 rounds of
the Russian Labor Force Survey (RLFS), conducted by the national and regional
ofﬁces of Goskomstat. The basic survey asks standard questions about employ-
ment, job searches, and related issues of a random sample of households in all
regions of the Russian Federation. A supplement, tailored to our research, was
added to the original survey in ﬁve Russian regions. The ﬁve regions, Moscow
City, Moscow Oblast, Chuvash Republic, Chelyabinsk, and Krasnoyarski Krai,
were selected as representative of the diffuse labor market types throughout the
Russian Federation. More than 17,000 households were interviewed in these
regions, leading to around 25,000 individual records on the population of
working age. Responses by military/security personnel are limited and thus are
excluded from the analysis. Some of the variables analyzed, for example, the
decomposition of ownership into new private and privatized ﬁrms, and informa-
tion on the form of wage arrears could only be ascertained from questions in the
RLFS supplement.
Our second data source is the second phase of the Russian Longitudinal
Monitor Survey (RLMS), a longitudinal panel of around 4000 households across
the Russian Federation conducted in the Fall of each year between 1994 and
1996. The data contain a set of demographic and establishment characteristics,
not always the same as those in the RLFS, together with information on the labor
market activities of its sample. Despite its relatively small size, the main
advantage of this source is that it can track individuals and the incidence of wage
arrears over time and control for any unobserved individual heterogeneity that
may have an effect on the probability of experiencing wage arrears. For example,
if patronage is an important determinant of arrears, then this will be unobserved,
Lippoldt, Viktor Starodubrovskiy, and Ruslan Yemtsov as part of the TACIS-Ace project T94-
1073-R. For a full description of the supplement, see Lehmann et al. (1998).
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our sample to employees of working age and exclude the military.
5 The survey
design does not follow individuals if they move, but it does sample new
occupants of the same address in order to try to keep the panel balanced. We
therefore treat each wave as a separate cross section in the initial exploration of
the data and then match individuals across waves in order to analyze issues
related to persistence and mobility. There are around 10,000 observations in each
wave, of which around 4000 are at work in any wave.
The survey questions dealing with wage arrears are complementary across the
two surveys. Both ask questions of the form, “Does your place of work owe you
any money?” The RLFS supplement then asks for the month in which workers
were last paid, together with the type of payment made by the ﬁrm, ranging from
complete and on time to late and incomplete. The RLMS asks simply, “How
much money have they not paid you in total?” It then asks the number of months
since the worker was paid last. Respondents in both surveys are asked to state the
amount of money received from their employers after tax in the past month.
There is no distinction made between basic wages and bonuses. These wage
responses are then deﬂated by a national price deﬂator indexed to 100 at January
1996.
6 There is no indication whether wage arrears are estimated before or after
tax. With no information on how and when arrears accumulated, the total amount
of arrears is deﬂated by the inﬂation rate at the time of interview.
3. JOB INSECURITY AND WAGE ARREARS
How have the employment policies of ﬁrms adjusted to these uncertain times?
One possibility is that workers may be placed on temporary contracts or short-
time work by ﬁrms in trouble. The incidence of contract working and the pattern
of hours worked are outlined in Table 1 using RLFS data.
The vast majority of those at work have a permanent contract (row 1).
7
However, ﬁxed-term contracts are more prevalent among the stock of workers
with new jobs, as measured by those with job tenure of 12 months or less (row
2). Around 1 in 9 new jobs are temporary. Since new jobs are at the margin of
adjustment, it may be that a higher incidence of temporary work among new jobs
is an indication of greater insecurity in the labor market to come. These numbers
are, however, still low by some Western standards.
8 Probit estimates of the
incidence of permanent contracts for those in new jobs show that workers over
5 The RLMS is ambiguous on the nature of self-employment, referring instead to the extent of
self-ownership in the enterprise where the individual works. We exclude only those who say they own
between 51 and 100% of the enterprise.
6 There are no population weights in either data set.
7 More than 90% of those on ﬁxed-term contracts would have preferred to have a permanent
contract.
8 Gregg and Wadsworth (2000) show that around one in six new jobs are temporary in Britain.
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hours a week have substantially lower probabilities of having a permanent
contract. There is also a higher incidence of temporary work in the metropolitan
area than in the provinces, and new jobs are less likely to be permanent in the
new private sector.
9
Job insecurity may also be expressed by the chances of job separations. Using
the same RLMS data, Lehmann and Wadsworth (1999) establish that separations
are higher at any job tenure in Russia than they are in Poland and Britain.
However, the RLMS data do not distinguish between voluntary quits and layoffs.
Complementary ﬁrm-level data from the four regions in the November 1997
RLFS show that, in large and medium enterprises, the share of layoffs in
separations varied from 5% in the Chuvash Republic to 9% in Krasnoyarsk while
the share of voluntary quits was lowest in Krasnoyarsk, with 72%, and highest in
the Chuvash Republic, with 92%. On the basis of these data, layoffs seem to
constitute only a small part of separations.
10
When asked about employment, respondents may think that this refers to the
enterprise where they deposit their labor book, whether they actually work there
9 These results are available from the authors on request or may be found in Lehmann et al. (1998).
10 The high quit shares are somewhat dubious as ﬁrms might force workers to quit voluntarily to
avoid responsibility for severance pay. Small changes in net employment in Russia in the face of large
total separations can also be explained by simultaneous large hirings (Foley, 1997a).
TABLE 1
Percentage Distribution of Job Types and Hours Worked by Region
Contract Moscow
Moscow
Oblast Krasnoyarsk
Chuvash
Republic Chelyabinsk
Percentage with permanent job 1996 97.6 97.4 96.8 98.1 98.5
1997 98.3 n/a 97.2 97.7 98.4
Percentage with permanent job
in new jobs 1996 84.3 86.9 86.9 91.7 93.6
1997 89.5 n/a 83.8 91.7 92.7
Percentage with part-time job 1996 2.9 3.0 5.0 4.1 2.8
1997 0.9 n/a 3.5 1.5 3.9
Percentage working fewer hours 1996 4.8 5.3 5.9 10.8 7.1
1997 1.9 n/a 5.2 8.2 5.0
Percentage working same hours 1996 92.2 91.9 87.3 87.5 91.0
1997 96.3 n/a 91.7 89.8 91.5
Percentage with second jobs 1996 2.7 1.5 2.7 1.0 2.2
1997 0.9 n/a 1.1 1.1 2.2
Source. RLFS.
Note. New jobs include all those with job tenure of 12 months or less. Part-time jobs, hours, and
second jobs are calculated as a percentage of all employees.
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will have a permanent contract. For this reason, it is useful to see how many
hours those who claim to have a permanent contract actually worked in their
primary employment and to compare these with the usual hours worked. Table
1 shows that the vast majority of individuals worked the same hours as usual.
Around two-thirds of those not working normal hours worked fewer, rather than
more, hours than usual. Nearly half of those who worked less were on zero hours.
This suggests that about 3% of the sample were on leave. About half of this
group, or 1.5% of the total sample of employed workers, had not received a wage
in the month of interview and were presumably on unpaid leave during the
reference week.
11 There is some variation in fewer hours worked at the regional
level, with a spread of around 5 percentage points between the Chuvash Repub-
lic, where we observe the highest value, and Moscow City, where less than 5%
of workers worked fewer than normal hours. Despite these regional variations, it
appears that in both 1996 and 1997 most employees had a permanent contract
and a full workload.
According to the RLMS, around 9% of the employed were on unpaid leave in
1994. The median duration for this group was 30 days, while the mean duration
amounted to 43 days. In both 1995 and 1996, the median duration of unpaid leave
was again 30 days, with somewhat higher values for the mean duration than in
1994 (53 and 50 days, respectively). The incidence, on the other hand, fell in
1995 to 6% and rose to 7.5% in 1996. Few workers are employed part-time.
Around 3% of the RLFS sample of employees work part-time. Part-time work
does not seem to be the route by which enterprises maintain employment levels.
Nor do many workers seem to hold a second job. No more than 3% of employees
admit to being engaged in additional work.
This evidence does not suggest that there is insecurity on the intensive margin
for most of the employed workforce. Given the moderate fall of employment
relative to output during the ﬁrst years of transition
12 this seems remarkable. One
possible explanation is that there has been wage ﬂexibility instead (Layard and
Richter, 1995). At the end of 1995, average real wages had fallen, according to
Goskomstat (1996b), to around 34% of the level observed before transition began
(January 1992). Another price adjustment mechanism open to enterprises is the
delay of wage payments to workers. In March 1996, wage arrears for the entire
economy averaged one month’s wage bill (Goskomstat, 1996b). There is little
doubt that the problem has worsened since them. Goskomstat ﬁgures put the
11 The fractions of persons on zero hours and on unpaid leave are reported for March 1996 and are
not shown in Table 1. We get this low incidence of unpaid leave in our RLFS sample because the two
relatively dynamic labor markets of Moscow City and Moscow Oblast dominate the sample.
12 According to Goskomstat (1996a), employment fell between the beginning of 1992 and the end
of 1995 by about 7%, while GDP fell by around 40%. Production in medium and large enterprises
shrank by 60% over the same period (Russian European Centre for Economic Policy, 1995).
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some 138% of the monthly wage bill (Russian European Center for Economic
Policy, 1997).
The number of workers affected by arrears is huge. According to the RLMS,
the wages of six out of ten workers were in arrears across the whole country in
1996, up from 40% in 1994. Moreover, according to RLFS data in Table 2, there
is a substantial variation in the incidence of arrears across regions. In Moscow
City, more than three-quarters of all employees received a complete wage on
time, while in Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, and the Chuvash Republic only around
one-third did so.
13 Outside Moscow, the typical form of arrears appears to have
changed over time as the arrears problem worsened. In 1996, the modal form of
arrears was to pay an incomplete salary, but on time. By late 1997, according to
the RLFS, the modal arrears payment was incomplete and late. Moreover, of
those with wages in arrears, the 1997 RLFS indicates that just under half those
living outside Moscow were also paid some of their arrears in-kind, with
products made by their ﬁrms.
14 On the basis of these ﬁgures it is hard to maintain
the hypothesis that wage arrears are not a major problem in many parts of the
Russian Federation.
One explanation for the divergent performance of regions could simply be that,
as a result of political lobbying, workers in the budgetary sector receive complete
13 For the eight regions identiﬁed in the RLMS, the incidence of arrears in 1996 was 31.7% for
Metropolitan, 69.1% for North West, 49.3% for Central, 66.3% for Volga, 65.6% for Caucasus,
65.7% for Urals, 65.7% for Western Siberia, and 67.9% for East.
14 The percentage ﬁgures are 1.3 for Moscow, 44.7 for Krasnoyarsk, 35.9 for Chelyabinsk, and 59.7
for Chuvashy. Of those not in arrears, only 3% were paid in-kind, although this rises to 10% outside
Moscow.
TABLE 2
Percentage Distribution of Wage Arrears by Region
Wages paid Moscow
Moscow
Oblast Krasnoyarsk
Chuvash
Republic Chelyabinsk
In full, on time 1996 76.8 71.8 34.7 42.5 33.7
1997 87.3 n/a 34.3 35.8 40.0
In full, not on time 1996 2.5 2.6 3.5 1.7 2.8
1997 0.9 n/a 4.6 3.4 4.0
Incomplete, on time 1996 15.3 19.4 39.6 41.7 39.9
1997 8.4 n/a 22.4 26.7 23.4
Incomplete, not on time 1996 5.4 6.2 22.1 14.2 23.5
1997 3.4 n/a 38.7 34.0 32.6
Source. RLFS.
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15 The data do not
support this hypothesis, as the middle panel of Table 3 shows. If anything,
workers in the budgetary sector in the provinces have a lower incidence of wage
arrears compared to privatized ﬁrms. The worst offenders are not government
agencies but state ﬁrms.
16 In March 1996, the budgetary sector accounted for
35% of employment and 30% of all those with wages in arrears in our sample.
In no region is this ranking reversed. This must imply that, in March 1996,
differential regional transfers of government funds were not the main reason for
regional divergence in wage arrears.
17
The incidence of arrears is lower in the new private sector. This could be
consistent with the idea that wage arrears are a means of attracting tax conces-
sions in the state and privatized sectors. However, in the regions outside Mos-
cow, the incidence of arrears in new private sector ﬁrms is much higher. This
suggests that the regional environment can inﬂuence the behavior of all ﬁrms
irrespective of ownership. If most ﬁrms withhold pay, the lack of a decent outside
option for workers makes it easier for other ﬁrms to do likewise.
The industrial composition of the regions could also be important. Certain
industries were hit harder by the transformation process, and the legacy of
planning has left some regions with a disproportionate share of industries in
15 In March 1996, around 42% of all employees worked in the budgetary sector. Those in
state-owned ﬁrms in other services, transport, distribution and trade, health and education, and
ﬁnance are considered to be in the budgetary sector.
16 The production sector comprises agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and energy.
17 Note that the possibility that the federal government made greater efforts to pay wages in the
budgetary sector before the 1996 election looks unlikely given the greater rise in the incidence of
arrears among other ﬁrm types between 1996 and 1997.
TABLE 3
Wage Arrears by Region, Ownership, and Sector
Year Moscow
Moscow
Oblast Krasnoyarsk Chuvash Chelyabinsk
Privatized 1996 25.7 31.2 67.9 48.9 75.7
1997 14.0 n/a 78.2 72.7 67.8
De novo private 1996 10.4 23.2 41.8 36.4 59.9
1997 4.0 n/a 38.9 64.3 33.3
Budgetary sector 1996 20.7 20.8 63.6 50.7 58.1
1997 12.6 n/a 68.0 51.8 51.0
State ﬁrms in
production 1996 37.7 37.3 76.4 68.8 74.1
1997 21.4 n/a 71.0 84.2 85.2
Source. RLFS.
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are particularly bad offenders. According to the RLMS in 1996, just 40% of
employees in the energy sector, 20% of those in agriculture, and 33% of those in
manufacturing received a complete wage on time. For workers in distribution/
trade and ﬁnance, wage arrears do not seem to pose as much of a problem. Only
31% and 20% of workers in these sectors had wages in arrears in 1996.
We next estimate probit regressions of the incidence of wage arrears using
RLMS data. We present the results from simple pooling of each cross section
across the three waves alongside random effects estimates, which account for
unobserved heterogeneity by taking account of the fact that the same worker
could appear up to three times in the sample.
18 The regressions include region,
industry, ﬁrm type, and individual worker controls. The marginal effects in Table
5 represent the impact of each variable on the probability of having wages in
arrears, holding other factors constant as percentage point deviations from the
18 This assumes that this heterogeneity is time invariant but unique to the individual so that the
error term comprises
vit 5 ai 1 uit i 5 1, 2. . .N; t 5 1, 2. . .T,
where a i is the random effect, with a i ; N(0, s a
2) independently of u it. Each disturbance term
thus has variance Var(v it) 5 Var(s a
2 1 s u
2), and the correlation between error terms for the same
individual is given by
Corr~ai 1 uit, ai 1 uis! 5 r 5 s a
2/~s a
2 1 s u
2!.
The parameters of the likelihood function, which constitute this model, are estimated using the
iterative techniques in the Stata statistical package. The simple pooled probit model is equivalent
to assuming that r 5 0. See Greene (1997) for a discussion of random effects probit estimators.
TABLE 4
Wage Arrears by Industry
Percentage of workers
with wages in arrears
Employment
share, 1996 1994 1996
Agriculture 68.6 80.6 10.8
Manufacturing 43.4 67.4 22.7
Construction 50.4 69.1 5.9
Energy 36.2 57.4 8.6
Transport 36.5 51.5 8.4
Distribution/trade 23.9 31.3 8.2
Finance 17.5 19.6 1.4
Health/education 35.2 67.7 20.4
Other services 35.4 51.3 13.5
Source. RLMS.
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Probit and Random Effects Probit Estimates of Wage Arrears
Variable
Sample
mean
Probit
Random effects
probit estimate Estimate
Marginal
effects
Female 0.517 20.065 (0.028)* 20.026 20.085 (0.045)
Children 0.633 0.049 (0.027) 0.019 0.057 (0.043)
Age
16–19 0.013 20.299 (0.116)* 20.116 20.389 (0.164)*
20–24 0.092 20.083 (0.048) 20.033 20.081 (0.071)
25–34 0.250 20.003 (0.033) 20.001 20.019 (0.051)
35–44
45–54 0.205 0.002 (0.036) 0.001 20.010 (0.056)
.55 0.125 20.114 (0.043)* 20.045 20.128 (0.069)
Education
High school only
Higher education 0.212 20.082 (0.047) 20.032 20.115 (0.070)
Technical school 0.239 0.061 (0.039) 0.024 0.069 (0.057)
Trade school 0.155 20.028 (0.041) 20.011 20.055 (0.059)
Technical quals. 0.082 20.011 (0.050) 20.004 0.001 (0.069)
Any professional course 0.127 0.118 (0.044)* 0.047 0.142 (0.061)*
Occupation
Operatives, unskilled, manual
Managers 0.020 20.338 (0.095)* 20.131 20.410 (0.133)*
Professions 0.181 20.022 (0.049) 20.009 20.019 (0.071)
Technicians 0.154 20.147 (0.044)* 20.058 20.183 (0.063)*
Clerical 0.067 20.288 (0.054)* 20.112 20.367 (0.079)*
Personal services 0.072 20.209 (0.057)* 20.082 20.292 (0.082)*
Agricultural worker 0.005 20.498 (0.178)* 20.187 20.707 (0.248)*
Craft 0.181 20.007 (0.036) 20.003 20.004 (0.052)
Employer size
0–9 0.073 20.257 (0.061)* 20.101 20.395 (0.087)*
10–49 0.201 20.241 (0.046)* 20.095 20.371 (0.068)*
50–99 0.099 20.190 (0.053)* 20.075 20.265 (0.076)*
100–499 0.206 20.107 (0.044)* 20.042 20.128 (0.064)*
500–999 0.056 20.122 (0.059)* 20.048 20.156 (0.084)
.1000
Length of employment
0–5 months 0.101 20.376 (0.057)* 20.146 20.513 (0.081)*
6–11 months 0.064 20.310 (0.061)* 20.121 20.410 (0.087)*
12–23 months 0.107 20.242 (0.054)* 20.095 20.339 (0.077)*
3–5 years 0.198 20.169 (0.047)* 20.067 20.213 (0.069)*
6–10 years 0.147 20.066 (0.049) 20.026 20.099 (0.072)
11–20 years 0.181 20.023 (0.045) 20.009 0.006 (0.067)
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Variable
Sample
mean
Probit
Random effects
probit estimate Estimate
Marginal
effects
.20 years
Ownership
State
Private 0.252 20.079 (0.032)* 20.032 20.092 (0.042)*
Foreign stake 0.036 20.046 (0.066) 20.018 20.035 (0.088)
Share in ﬁrm 0.213 20.101 (0.050)* 20.043 20.104 (0.069)
Share ,5% 0.145 0.111 (0.056)* 0.044 0.135 (0.076)
Region
Urals
North, North–West 0.078 0.192 (0.053)* 0.076 0.247 (0.084)*
Central and central black-earth 0.178 20.208 (0.041)* 20.082 20.286 (0.066)*
Volga 0.170 0.117 (0.041)* 0.046 0.148 (0.067)*
North Caucasus 0.119 20.132 (0.046)* 20.052 20.190 (0.075)*
Moscow/St. Petersburg 0.100 20.410 (0.051)* 20.158 20.602 (0.081)*
Western Siberia 0.100 0.072 (0.047) 0.029 0.077 (0.077)
East Siberia and Far East 0.102 0.227 (0.048)* 0.090 0.294 (0.076)*
Location
Urban
Rural 0.220 0.489 (0.036)* 0.193 0.694 (0.057)*
Industry
Agriculture
Manufacturing 0.209 0.326 (0.055)* 0.129 0.427 (0.079)*
Construction 0.062 0.172 (0.054)* 0.069 0.214 (0.078)*
Energy 0.069 20.189 (0.051)* 20.074 20.242 (0.076)*
Transport 0.079 20.279 (0.049)* 20.109 20.335 (0.073)*
Retail 0.077 20.434 (0.059)* 20.167 20.491 (0.084)*
Finance 0.013 20.807 (0.138)* 20.282 20.943 (0.185)*
Health 0.172 20.057 (0.043) 20.023 20.079 (0.064)
Other services 0.126 20.187 (0.044)* 20.074 20.219 (0.065)*
Constant 0.707 (0.073)* 0.951 (0.111)*
chi2(55) 5 1682.95 chi2(55) 5 1194.5
Log L 52 7746.7 Log L 52 7416.9
Pseudo R
2 5 0.115 r 5 0.475 (0.018)*
Source. RLMS.
Note. Regressions also include two wave dummies and missing dummies for non-response in
education, job tenure, occupation, and industry. Default categories are in italics. Standard errors in
brackets. Number of observations, 12,657. Mean of dependent variable, 0.472.
* Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
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19 The size and statistical signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient estimates
show that industry, region, and enterprise characteristics rather than individual
characteristics are the main determinants of wage arrears. Workers in the largest
enterprises have the highest probability of experiencing wage arrears. Private
ownership reduces the incidence of wage arrears by around three percentage
points, other things equal. The ranking of industries in the incidence of workers
with wages in arrears observed in Table 4 is maintained with the addition of other
controls. Workers in manufacturing are some 13 percentage points more likely to
experience wage arrears than workers in agriculture, who are in turn some 28
percentage points more likely to experience wage arrears than workers in the
ﬁnance sector. All occupational groups have a lower incidence of wage arrears
compared to the default group of unskilled manual workers. The gap is larger and
signiﬁcant for managers and clerical workers.
The regressions include share ownership and job tenure dummies as potential
measures of insider power and the likelihood of the work force accepting arrears.
The share ownership dummies indicate whether the individual worker has a stake
in a ﬁrm and whether that stake is under 5%. The coefﬁcients are equal and
opposite in sign, so that for two-thirds of workers with a stake in their ﬁrms, i.e.,
for those with a share less than 5%, there is no protection from experiencing
wage arrears. Ownership reduces the chance of arrears, but a small share in the
ﬁrm raises the likelihood of arrears, other things equal. The impact of job tenure
is large and highly signiﬁcant. Workers with longer tenures have higher proba-
bilities of experiencing wage arrears. These results negate the idea that ownership
facilitates arrears over and above the effect of long tenure. An interaction of
ownership with job tenure was insigniﬁcant and is not reported.
Of the demographic factors, women are around 2.5 percentage points less
likely to experience wage arrears. The youngest workers are some 12 points less
likely to be in arrears than the default 35–44-year-old category, although the
differences between other age groups are smaller and less signiﬁcant. Education
seems to have little impact, with the exception of professional training, which
seems to increase the chances of being in arrears by some 4.5 percentage points.
With the demographic and skill composition of the workforce, ownership, and
industrial structure controlled for, the regression still points to the importance of
regional location for the incidence of wage arrears. The marginal effects indicate
a regional spread of 25 percentage points between Moscow or St. Petersburg and
the East. There is, in addition, a signiﬁcant positive rural effect on arrears of
around 19 points. This may suggest that enterprises and workers living distant
from the main administrative centers ﬁnd it harder to plead their case.
The estimated effects do not change much between the simple pooling and the
19 The marginal effect of xi on the probability of observing wages in arrears, P, is given by
dP/dxi 5 bif(XB), where f[ is the standard normal density function, X is the vector of
characteristics, including xi, and B the vector of probit coefﬁcients.
WAGE ARREARS IN RUSSIA 607random effects model. The ﬁrm/industry-level effects continue to dominate,
which tends to negate the idea that discrimination across individuals in the same
plant is widespread. Nevertheless, the probability of experiencing arrears does
vary widely across the population. Taking the coefﬁcients together, we estimate
that an unskilled, male worker aged 35 to 44 living in the Volga region and
working in a manufacturing enterprise of over 1000 workers for more than 10
years has an arrears probability of 95%. In contrast, a 25-year old woman
graduate working in a ﬁnance company that employs less than 10 workers in the
metropolitan area has a 5% chance of suffering wage arrears.
Separate probit regressions by industry and by region, based on RLFS data,
conﬁrm the previous results.
20 Within each industry, demographic characteristics
play a lesser role in the determination of wage arrears than do characteristics
related to the establishment. Regional location is the strongest contributing factor
of arrears in all industries. The regressions by region, on the other hand, conﬁrm
that industry afﬁliation and ﬁrm characteristics dominate the determination of
wage arrears in each region. Workers in an industry that on average has a low
incidence of wage arrears experience lower risk in wage arrears in all regions.
Workers in the metropolitan center will experience wage arrears if they work in
a poorly performing industry.
4. PERSISTENCE OF WAGE ARREARS AND WORKER MOBILITY
One as yet unresolved issue is how long wage arrears persist and whether the
same individuals are affected over time. If wage arrears were shared equally
across the population, there would be less cause for concern than if arrears were
concentrated on the same individuals. To address this issue, we simply count the
number of times individuals are observed with wages in arrears across the three
waves of the RLMS, restricting our sample to those continuously employed.
21
While we cannot observe the start of the arrears process, we can observe inﬂows
and outﬂows, together with the cumulation of arrears. Table 6 shows that, over
the three-year observation period, a combination of rising inﬂow rate and falling
outﬂow rate contributed to a rising stock of arrears in the population. The average
real level of arrears grew by around 40%, and the amount owed rises monoton-
ically according to the number of years the individual is observed in arrears.
20 The results are available from the authors upon request or may be found in Lehmann et al.
(1998).
21 The RLMS indicates that, according to a probit estimate, those with wages in arrears were some
5 percentage points more likely to have separated from employment one year later than those with
wages not in arrears. Those who drop out of the sample are some 7 points less likely to have wages
in arrears, other things equal. Around 30% cannot be matched across successive waves, and around
10% leave employment within a year. These two effects therefore work in opposite directions, but the
overall effect on estimates of persistence of conﬁning the sample to those continuously in employ-
ment is more likely to cause overestimation of the degree of persistence.
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continuous period of non-payment. To check this we examine the length of time
since last paid for each worker with wages in arrears in each wave. The ﬁgures
in brackets give median duration and 95th percentile of duration distribution of
arrears. The ﬁgures indicate that 95% of those with wages in arrears said they had
been last paid less than 12 months before. The median delay is two months in
1994, rising to four months in 1996. This is consistent with the increased share
of delayed payments observed in Table 2.
Arrears are also distributed unequally. By 1996, one quarter of the sample
working population had been in arrears in each of the three waves, while another
quarter had yet to experience any arrears. The median level of arrears does not
rise proportionately between new entrants and those in arrears previously, as the
second panel in Table 6 shows. This suggests that those in arrears have some of
their debt paid off during the year. The median size of arrears relative to previous
TABLE 6
Persistence of Wage Arrears
1994 1995 1996
No. times in arrears
0 60.7 36.4 27.9
1 39.3 33.5 27.5
[2 and 12 months]
2 30.1 22.4
[2 and 8 months]
3 22.1
[4 and 12 months]
Median arrears (000 Rs)
1 539 378 593
2 559 848
3 1082
Average median 539 485 832
Ratio of arrears relative to
previous monthly earnings
At 10th arrears percentile 0.26 0.57
At 50th arrears percentile 0.98 2.00
At 90th arrears percentile 2.98 6.90
Percentage of workers
entering or leaving
arrears over the year
Arrears outﬂow 31 17
Arrears inﬂow 28 44
Source. RLMS.
Note. Median arrears duration and 95th percentile of duration distribution are in brackets in the ﬁrst
panel.
WAGE ARREARS IN RUSSIA 609wages also grows from around one month’s salary to two month’s salary from
1995 to 1996 (panel 3, Table 6).
In order to identify the characteristics of those persistently in arrears, Table 7
presents the results of ordered probit estimates of the probability that an indi-
vidual, in wave 3, would have been observed in arrears 0, 1, 2, or 3 times. This
approach avoids the problem of introducing lagged dependent variables into a
regression, which could otherwise deliver inconsistent estimates. The sample is
conﬁned to those in employment in all three waves. The ordered probit results
mirror the simple binary probit estimates. Unskilled, male workers between 35
and 44 years of age living in the regions furthest from the metropolitan areas and
working in large scale enterprises for 10 years or more are most at risk from
multiple wage arrears. In addition, in order to distinguish between the extensive
and intensive nature of arrears, we present Tobit estimates of the amount of
arrears for all workers in employment in 1996. Those not in arrears are censored
at zero. We estimate the determinants of the total stock of arrears for each
worker, indexed for inﬂation. The Tobit estimates follow the same basic pattern
regarding the incidence and persistence of arrears. The level of arrears is reduced
signiﬁcantly by the presence of foreign ownership in the establishment. Few of
the personal characteristics retain any statistical signiﬁcance. Firm size, job
tenure, and region dominate.
Finally, there is the question, “why, if ﬁrms don’t pay wages on time, do
workers not simply move elsewhere?” This may be due to the condition that
search unemployment is not a valid outside option in all but the most dynamic
labor markets. Unemployment beneﬁts are not available to job quits, and when
they are paid,
22 they are not large relative to average wages. Moreover, alterna-
tive employment is perhaps available only in the most dynamic regions, typically
Moscow and St. Petersburg, and the claim on arrears may be loosened once a
worker leaves an establishment. Quits will be encouraged by a dynamic outside
labor market (push effects) but discouraged by the need or ability to recoup
arrears, magniﬁed when inﬂation is low (pull effects).
To capture these effects, we measure mobility conditional on arrears over the
course of a year using the RLMS panel. We identify three possible labor market
transitions, a move from an existing ﬁrm to employment with a new establish-
ment, a move from employment to unemployment, and a move from employment
to inactivity.
23 Of those moving out of employment, around one-third say that
they are actively seeking new work and one-quarter say that they are retired. The
rest are scattered among other home production activities. We then run a
22 Clarke (1998) notes that unemployment beneﬁt arrears are now a feature in many regions.
23 The RLMS cannot distinguish between job quits and layoffs. We believe that job-to-job moves
will be dominated by quits, as in most Western countries. Also recall the low layoff shares cited in
Section 3.
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Ordered Probit and Tobit Estimates of Incidence of Wage Arrears
Variable
Ordered probit
estimate Tobit estimate
Female 20.093 (0.053) 2452.8 (93.4)*
Children 0.052 (0.052) 169.5 (92.5)
Age
16–19 20.899 (0.692) 2531.2 (703.4)
20–24 20.165 (0.114) 2268.2 (156.3)
25–34 0.022 (0.061) 3.7 (105.6)
35–44
45–54 0.002 (0.066) 24.9 (118.3)
.55 20.127 (0.081) 95.7 (143.8)
Education
High school only
Higher education 20.083 (0.088) 2274.9 (153.3)
Technical 0.023 (0.072) 227.8 (125.0)
Trade school 0.030 (0.079) 280.0 (136.0)
PTU 20.162 (0.094) 2194.3 (167.2)
Any professional course 0.154 (0.083) 87.9 (144.5)
Occupation
Operatives, unskilled manual
Managers 20.351 (0.266) 807.4 (501.4)
Professions 20.004 (0.090) 296.4 (155.5)
Technicians 20.054 (0.081) 113.5 (138.6)
Clerical 20.249 (0.098)* 2349.5 (178.9)
Personal serv. 20.014 (0.118) 25.9 (193.4)
Agricutural worker 20.643 (0.296)* 2323.3 (591.1)
Craft 0.077 (0.069) 195.1 (119.4)
Employer Size
0–9 20.336 (0.121)* 21148.5 (201.7)*
10–49 20.303 (0.087)* 2960.6 (149.4)*
50–99 20.259 (0.097)* 2635.1 (168.0)*
100–499 20.129 (0.081) 2306.3 (140.2)*
500–999 20.152 (0.110) 2596.2 (201.5)*
.1000
Length of employment
0–5 months 20.170 (0.128) 21011.9 (195.6)*
6–11 months 20.058 (0.145) 2660.9 (203.8)*
12–23 months 20.103 (0.104) 2548.2 (174.8)*
3–5 years 20.196 (0.083)* 2440.3 (149.3)*
6–10 years 20.078 (0.086) 2173.8 (157.4)
11–20 years 20.059 (0.081) 2145.4 (148.2)
.20 years
Ownership
State
Private 20.053 (0.057) 163.2 (94.3)
Foreign stake 20.073 (0.129) 2521.8 (222.2)*
WAGE ARREARS IN RUSSIA 611multinomial logit regression on the determinants of these discrete events in Table
8, including a variable to capture whether the worker had wages in arrears one
year earlier. The base category is the sample of workers who remain with the
same ﬁrm over the year. The reported coefﬁcients are marginal effects relative to
the sample mean transition probability. The arrears variable is signiﬁcant and
positive for job-to-job moves and also for moves from employment to unem-
TABLE 7—Continued
Variable
Ordered probit
estimate Tobit estimate
Region
Urals
North, North–West 0.251 (0.097)* 978.4 (166.5)*
Central and central black-earth 20.217 (0.075)* 2721.1 (134.5)*
Volga 0.178 (0.074)* 2263.9 (135.7)*
North Caucasus 20.112 (0.089) 2236.2 (150.5)
Moscow/St. Petersburg 20.349 (0.100)* 21165.3 (175.7)*
Western Siberia 0.199 (0.092)* 69.7 (155.6)
East Siberia and Far East 0.286 (0.096)* 596.2 (155.7)*
Location
Urban
Rural 0.676 (0.068)* 428.6 (115.5)*
Industry
Agriculture
Manufacturing 0.329 (0.103)* 138.3 (181.1)
Construction 0.120 (0.107) 757.1 (185.2)*
Energy 20.198 (0.092)* 673.6 (159.7)*
Transport 20.216 (0.097)* 2294.0 (172.2)
Retail 20.710 (0.122)* 2843.6 (214.1)*
Finance 21.136 (0.236)* 2891.2 (453.6)
Health 20.022 (0.088) 194.5 (133.3)
Other services 20.294 (0.089)* 2174.9 (148.2)
Constant 1144.6 (227.5)*
Mu (1) 21.073 (0.129)*
Mu (2) 20.295 (0.128)*
Mu (3) 0.432 (0.128)*
Sigma: 2055.39 (34.98)*
N 5 2493 N 5 3499
Chi2(51) 5 555.9 chi2(51) 5 604.5
Log L 52 3176.1 Log L 52 18546.1
Pseudo R
2 5 0.081 Pseudo R
2 5 0.016
Source. RLMS.
Note. Regressions also include two wave dummies and missing dummies for non-response in
education, job tenure, occupation, and industry. Default categories are in italics. Robust standard
errors are in brackets.
* Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
LEHMANN, WADSWORTH, AND ACQUISTI 612ployment or inactivity. The magnitude of these effects is, however, small. Those
in arrears are around one percentage point more likely to move job-to-job
compared with the mean transition probability of 7.5%. The push inﬂuence is not
quite offset by the inducement to stay and retain employment and/or wages in
arrears.
We then interact the arrears dummy with the dummy for the metropolitan areas
of Moscow and St. Petersburg. This interaction term is highly signiﬁcant in the
job-to-job move equation, but not for the moves out of employment. In the
metropolitan areas, those in arrears are an additional 4.7 points, or around 75%,
more likely than other workers to be found in a new job one year later. Thus the
exit option to a new job is valid only in a relatively prosperous labor market.
TABLE 8
Multinomial Logit Estimates of Effects of Wage Arrears on Mobility
Variable
Job-to-job
marginal effects
Job to unemp.
marginal effects
Job to inactivity
marginal effects
Arrears 0.012 (0.006)* 0.008 (0.004)* 0.011 (0.005)*
Arrears*Moscow/St. Peter. 0.047 (0.018)* 0.012 (0.015) 0.018 (0.010)
Ownership
State
Private 0.001 (0.007) 0.015 (0.004)* 0.008 (0.006)
Foreign 0.025 (0.013)* 20.019 (0.013) 20.007 (0.015)
Region
Urals
North, North–West 20.020 (0.012) 20.005 (0.008) 0.004 (0.011)
Central and central black-earth 20.015 (0.009) 20.002 (0.006) 0.003 (0.008)
Volga 20.024 (0.009)* 20.014 (0.007)* 0.012 (0.008)
North Caucasus 20.023 (0.011)* 0.006 (0.006) 0.019 (0.009)*
Moscow/St. Petersburg 20.014 (0.013) 20.010 (0.010) 0.006 (0.011)
Western Siberia 20.031 (0.012)* 20.007 (0.008) 0.010 (0.010)
East Siberia and Far East 20.004 (0.011) 20.009 (0.008) 0.008 (0.009)
Location
Urban
Rural 20.030 (0.009)* 20.001 (0.005) 0.018 (0.006)*
Constant 20.169 (0.020)* 20.099 (0.014)* 20.126 (0.016)*
Log L 23647.4
Pseudo R
2 0.108
Chi
2 (153) 947.4
Source. RLMS.
Note. Regression includes controls for age, education, gender, marital status, job tenure, estab-
lishment size, industry, and occupation. Default categories are in italics. Sample mean transition
rates: job-to-job, 0.075; work-to-unemployment, 0.042; work-to-inactivity, 0.062. Sample size,
6,246.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
WAGE ARREARS IN RUSSIA 613Quits may induce ﬁrms to pay wages, but this strategy can only work if there are
viable outside opportunities. Indeed the RLMS data set indicates that job-to-job
movers who were initially in arrears are some 10 percentage points less likely to
be in arrears in the new ﬁrm compared with other job-to-job movers. A relatively
healthy labor market facilitates job-to-job moves by those in arrears.
5. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
In the context of the relatively small falls in employment since the beginning
of reform, the evidence on job security in Russia is quite compelling. On the
quantity side, Russian workers face relatively secure job prospects. The over-
whelming majority of employees have permanent contracts and work full-time.
It is also clear that temporary layoffs and unpaid leave affect only a small
percentage of the work force. In addition, short-term work seems not to be the
way by which Russian ﬁrms maintain employment levels. Despite major demand
shocks that have put many Russian enterprises in great ﬁnancial difﬁculty, ﬁrms
seem to try to hold on to their employees.
Instead, adjustment to negative demand shocks seems to occur through price
rather than quantity changes. Real wages fell steeply from the beginning of the
reforms until 1996. The new adjustment factor is now undoubtedly the systematic
withholding of wage payments from workers, and this is now the dominant form
of insecurity for many Russian workers. Moreover, wage arrears are a major
problem for certain industrial branches of the economy and provincial regions. In
agriculture, manufacturing, construction, and health and education less than
one-third of all employees received their wages in full in 1996. In the capital of
the Russian Federation, late or incomplete wage payments affected just 13% of
employees in November 1997. In contrast, in many provincial regions like
Chelyabinsk, the Chuvash Republic, and Krasnoyarsk, nearly two-thirds of all
workers had to be content with such payments.
The data sets at our disposal do not allow us to distinguish the various
hypotheses offered as to why ﬁrms withhold wages. However, we have provided
evidence that allows us to offer some observations. A cynical interpretation of the
large regional divergence in wage arrears observed here could be that, histori-
cally, rebellion and revolution in Russia have been successful only if carried in
the central, urban agglomerations. Therefore, conﬁning the problem of wage
arrears to the provinces might allow transition to proceed more smoothly. Our
evidence seems to point in this direction, as regional location is a key determinant
of wage arrears, independent of industry and ownership. However, a closer look
at the evidence establishes that the central government is not responsible directly
for the high levels and large regional variation of wage arrears. Instead, our
evidence implies that the presence or absence of a worker’s outside options in a
local labor market might best explain this variation. A dynamic local labor
LEHMANN, WADSWORTH, AND ACQUISTI 614market can mitigate the arrears problem by providing a valid outside option with
which workers can exercise the quit threat. The reform stance of regional
governments, in turn, might be a crucial ingredient in the process of generating
such a dynamic environment. The Moscow regional government, for its part, has
helped generate such an environment, through its reform programs and access to
the central government, that allow ﬁrms to survive and even prosper.
24
The large regional variation in the incidence of wage arrears and the fact that
many workers in new private ﬁrms in the provinces are affected by arrears seem
to provide evidence counter to the argument that ﬁrms use wage arrears as an
instrument to extract tax concessions from the government. Firm characteristics
dominate individual characteristics throughout our study. As a result, there is
polarization in the incidence of arrears across the working population. Some
people seem never to suffer from wage arrears while others do so continuously.
This may be due to the uneven incidence of wage arrears across sectors rather
than to some kind of extreme efﬁciency wage strategy pursued by ﬁrms. Ob-
servable individual characteristics do not drive the arrears problem, and controls
for unobserved heterogeneity, perhaps capturing discrimination or patronage, do
not alter these ﬁndings.
There is an argument that workers may tolerate wage arrears in their primary
employment because most of them hold multiple jobs, with income sources in
secondary and tertiary employment being much more important than the income
source from primary employment. Our evidence does not support this. Employ-
ees who face wage arrears exercise their quit option in the metropolitan center
only. They do not exercise this option in the provincial regions not because they
do not care about primary employment but because they have no outside jobs to
move to. Nor does it appear that workers may be taking advantage of fringe
beneﬁts that would not be available if they left the ﬁrm. Evidence from the four
regions in the 1997 RLFS indicates that only health insurance and holiday pay
appear to be cited by workers as additional beneﬁts provided by their ﬁrms.
25
However, payments in-kind are given to around a quarter of the work force with
wage arrears outside Moscow.
24 Shleifer (1997) provides evidence on how entrepreneurs differ in their perception of the reform
stance of their respective regional government. Entrepreneurs in Moscow see their regional govern-
ment as reform-friendly and supportive of private business activities, while provincial entrepreneurs
complain about an administrative environment that is hostile to private business.
25 Foley (1997b) shows that arrears increase the probability of taking a second job. The author also
establishes that, according to the RLMS, multiple job holding grew in the years 1992 to 1996, but
only for from 5.6 to 10.1% of prime-age workers. A much larger fraction of the work force is affected
by wage arrears. Foley shows, in addition, that the likelihood of taking a second job is signiﬁcantly
higher for men, urban residents, and workers with higher education, i.e., for those persons who are
best positioned in the labor market.
WAGE ARREARS IN RUSSIA 615Evidence provided by the International Labor Organization (ILO) indicates
that wage arrears are also a problem in Ukraine and other countries of the former
Soviet Union. Yet they appear to be less of an issue in the transition economies
of Eastern and Central Europe. For example, Lehmann (1998) shows that, in
Hungary, even ﬁrms in deep ﬁnancial trouble consider payment of wages as the
ﬁrst call on funds. Perhaps, a weak legal environment in Russia and the other CIS
countries makes it more difﬁcult to enforce contracts and this explains the
difference. Our evidence lends support to the notion that wage arrears are an
important problem, affecting nearly two-thirds of the working population and
averaging around twice the average monthly wage. This is the most apparent
manifestation of insecurity currently observed in the Russian labor market.
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